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1. Introduction 
At present, sector is a key level of analysis for bth academics and policy makers. 
Related to several theoretical traditions such as innovation system approach, evolutionary 
theory, industry life cycle analysis and others, the concept of sectoral system of 
innovation and production is better than mainstream industrial economic analysis such as 
structure, conduct and performance, game theory and transaction cost analysis, as it 
provides a broader- and longer-term view on the evolution and dynamics of sectors. A 
sectoral system of innovation and production is a set of new and established products for 
specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market nd non-market interactions for the 
creation, production, and sale of those products. Sectoral systems have a knowledge base, 
technologies, inputs and demand. The agents are individuals and organizations at various 
levels of aggregation, with specific learning processes, competencies, organizational 
structure, beliefs, objectives and behaviors. They interaction through processes of 
communication, exchange, cooperation, competition and command, and their interactions 
are shaped by institutions. A sectoral system undergoes processes of change and 
transformation through co-evolution of its various elements (Malerba, 2002). The concept 
may be used to analyze sectors in several aspects, namely, for better understanding of the 
working, dynamics and transformation of sectors, for the identification of the factors 
affecting performance ad competitiveness of firms and countries, and for the 
development of new public policy proposals.  
 
Albeit useful, the concept needs further development, specially the verification and 
elucidation from more empirical research. One of important field of research in this area 
is to study how and why sectoral systems  of innovati n and production in the same 
industry but different countries differ from each other, i.e., their differences in terms of 
learning processes, technologies, input, demands, types and structures of interaction of 
players in the sector, underlying institutions and sector’s evolution. This paper will shed a 
light on this very important issue. A special attentio  will be paid to how sectoral systems 
of innovation and production in the same industry but across countries may evolve 
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differently after facing similar threats and opportuni ies caused by the same external 
factor. To elaborate on this, we will use the case of volution of the automotive sectors in 
Thailand and Vietnam and their dynamics and transformation when they are facing 
threats and opportunities from their fierce competitor, China. 
   
2.1 Overview of Motorcycle Industries in Thailand and Vietnam and Threats and 
Opportunities from China 
Threats and Opportunities from China is probably one f the most popular topics for 
Asian academics and policy makers. Members of Associati n of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), in particular, are very much concerned with the rise of China. China 
is seen as both a threat and an opportunity for ASEAN. Obviously, China’s huge market 
is very attractive for export and investment from ASEAN. Chinese tourists, increasing 
rapidly, are one of main target groups of ASEAN’s tourism promotion authorities. 
Several Chinese large conglomerates have invested in heavy industries and energy sector 
in ASEAN. At the same time, for second-tier Newly Industrialising Countries (Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines), China is a fierce competitor in their key 
industries such as automotive, electronics, textile and garments, and so on. For ASEAN’s 
members which are transitional economies (Vietnam, Lao, Cambodia), the rise of China 
can be viewed even more problematic, as it strongly affects efforts by these countries to 
industrialise and build up their indigenous technological capabilities. Not only 
opportunities for their export-led industrialization strategies lately started have been 
compromised by Chinese goods, their import-substitution strategies are in jeopardy 
because of flooding of Chinese consumer and industrial goods.  
 
On the global scale, motorcycle industry is a mid-tech and rather technologically mature 
industry. Automotive sector of several Asian latecomer economies started with 
assembling motorcycles and producing their parts by using imported technologies. 
Within ASEAN, Thailand and Vietnam are large producers with the production capacity 
of 3.5 million (Thai Automotive Institute, 2006) and  2 million (General Statistics Office, 
2006) respectively in 2005 . In both countries, markets are basically dominated by 
Japanese TNCs. Local companies are suppliers, especially second- or third-tier ones. 
Some of them, especially at the first tier, are joint ventures with foreign component 
makers.  
 
Motorcycle industry is also a typical example if the industry where China’s threat on 
other Asian countries has been enormous. China is the largest producer as well as the 
largest market of motorcycles in the world. In 2004 the country produced over 17 million 
motorcycles, 3.9 million of which were exported overseas (China Automotive 
Technology & Research Center and China Automotive Industry League, 2005). Chinese 
motorcycle industry is dominated by local companies that boast competitive advantage in 
mass production of low-priced products. Since the end of 1990s harsh competition at 
home has driven many Chinese motorcycle assembling companies to search for export 
market. The “export drive” of Chinese motorcycle companies has been perceived as a 
serious threat to motorcycle manufacturers in the region as well as the rest of the world, 




The studies of motorcycle industries in Thailand anVietnam were conducted separately 
but in the same year of 2004. The study in Thailand was commissioned by National 
Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) to the College of Technology 
and Innovation Management, King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi 
(KMUTT).  Thought its main focus is on the Tiger Motorcycle (a pure Thai groups of 
companies) cluster, the study also analyzes and synthesizes motorcycle industry as a 
whole in Thailand by exploring the roles and capabilities of main agents (both firm and 
non-firm), their linkages and learning processes.  The analysis of Thai motorcycle 
industry was drawn from the data from the questionnaire surveys and in-depth interview. 
One hundred and one questionnaires to relevant agents (mainly part suppliers) in the 
industry were sent with the return of 40 %. Together with the survey, ten interviews were 
conducted to explore at length the characteristics, linkages, activities, and interactions of 
key agent in the industry. Apart from the study, this paper rely on other secondary 
sources of information such as industry reports and government plans, and notes from 
conversation with main senior government officials nd companies’ executives.  
 
The study on Vietnam was conducted within the framework of research project 
“Motorcycle Industry in Asia” by the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) during 
2004-2005.  IDE commissioned a survey of motorcycle and parts companies in Vietnam 
to the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science (VIE-VASS), 
for which VIE-VASS conducted questionnaire surveys of 40 companies, including local 
and foreign (Taiwanese, Korean and Chinese) motorcycle and parts companies. The 
author, in collaboration with VIE, also conducted 10 of the surveyed companies to obtain 
qualitative information on the companies’ development process and current operations. In 
a separate attempt, the author conducted in-depth interv ews with Japanese motorcycle 
and parts manufacturing companies in Vietnam, Thailand and China.  In 2005, the author 
conducted follow-up interviews with some of the local and foreign (Japanese and 




2.3The Motorcycle Sectoral Innovation Systems in Thailand and Vietnam 
This section analyzes and compares elements of motorcycle sectoral systems of 
innovation and production of Thailand and Vietnam. These basic elements will be 
explore: products, agent (types, interactions and learning processes), and institutions (e.g. 
norms, routines, laws, regulations, standard) that s pe agents cognition ad action and 
affect the interaction among agents.  
 
3. 1 Products 
According to size of engine, motorcycle can be classified into 4 types: small (50cc-250 
cc), medium (251cc-750 cc), large (751 cc-1199cc) and very large (1200cc or more).  
Application-wise, there are also 4 types: standard motorcycle (small, simple, economical 
and easy to use), performance motorcycle (normally equipping with engine of more than 
251 and mostly for racing), styling/touring/luxurious motorcycle (normally with medium 
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or large engine), and individual owner customization motorcycle (normally with large 
engine) (see Kosnik, 1995).  
 
Motorcycles produced and used in developing countries including Thailand and Vietnam 
usually belong to the standard type with economical price and small engine (125 cc. or 
below). This segment has two prominent characteristics: (1) the use of mature technology, 
and (2) the dominance of  Japanese motorcycle companies.  In business motorcycle 
segment, Honda’s “Supercub” equipped with C100 engine still remains the dominant 
model.  C100 was developed back in the 1950s, and its basic technology has not gone 
through any major innovations for the past 30 to 40 years. Yet, the models developed on 
the basis of C100 still keep an overwhelming market share, though individual models are 
adjusted to meet local conditions such as climate, road conditions, and preferences of 
consumers (Ohara 2006a, 2006b).  Reflecting the proprietary advantage in technology, 
brand, and distribution channels, along with the “dominant model,” Japanese motorcycle 
companies and especially Honda hold an overwhelming share in the economical business 
motorcycle segment at the global scale (Ohara 2006b)  
 
Motorcycle units can be classified to two types: Completely Build Unit (CBU) and 
Completely Knock-Down (CKD) unit (a complete set of all parts ready for assembling).  
Many developing countries start import substitution f CBUs by simple assembly of 
imported CKD units, followed by the stage where thegovernment policies force the 
domestic assembling companies to increase the localcontent ratio of the motorcycles.  
Motorcycle industries in both Thailand and Vietnam followed this development path. 
 
There are also motorcycle parts. Important parts are body part, exhaust system/filter/fuel 
system, drive/transmission and steering parts, engin  part, suspension/brake/wheel, and 
instrument and seal.  In terms of models produced by Japanese motorcycle companies, 
the majority of the parts are “custom-made parts” specifically produced according to the 
specifications of the motorcycle company3.  In contrast, Chinese motorcycle companies 
have imitated the base models developed by Japanese motorcycle companies, including 
C100, often providing some “minor changes” (Ohara 2006a). This is also the case of Thai 
motorcycle companies. In China, the base models and engines are shared by companies 
in the entire industry, and for parts that do not require either originality in appearance 
design and technology or high accuracy and high quality, ready made parts available in 
the market are widely utilized (Ohara 2006a). Such market-based transactions also 
prevail in procurement networks of Vietnam’s local motorcycle companies, which started 
with simple assembly of Chinese parts. 
 
3.2 Agents: Types, Interactions and Learning Processes 
The main agents of the sector in the two countries ar  both firms (namely, own-brand 
manufacturers and part suppliers) and non-firms such as education institutes, research 
institutes, government sector-specific regulatory and supporting institutes). This section 
outlines the main agents of the sectors in the two countries prior to China’s export drive. 
 
                                                
3 Otahara (2006) notes that 90% of the motorcycle parts that motorcycle companies procure from parts 
manufacturers are specifically designed for each model.   
 5 
Firms 
Japanese TNCs which are Own-Brand Manufacturers (OBMs) play significant roles in 
both countries. Thailand, however, has longer history of producing motorcycles locally. 
Japanese TNCs have invested in the countries since 1960s, while investment in Vietnam 
started in the mid-1990s. Each TNC (Honda, Suzuki, Yamaha, and Kawasaki) has 
developed its own networks of suppliers. In 2004, Honda had the largest market share of 
72%. For suppliers, in total, there were 323 suppliers n Thailand, 122 of which supplied 
to both automobile and motorcycle producers (GMI, 2004). First-tier suppliers are 
usually medium-size firms and joint ventures between foreign firms (especially Japanese) 
and Thai entrepreneurs. They used to be Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs. 
However, due to global sourcing strategies of TNCs (sourcing parts and components 
from any supplier worldwide provided that TNCs’ demanded specifications and prices 
are met) since mid 1990s, they were forced to continuously improve efficiency and 
develop their design capabilities and, thereby, becoming Own-design Manufacturers or 
ODMs4 (Intarakumnerd et.al., 2002). The second-and third-tier (OEMs) suppliers are 
usually Thai companies with small factories and limited technological capability and 
number of employees. They sell motorcycle parts to the first-tier suppliers. Some part 
makers, the so-called Replacement Equipment Manufacturers (REMs), instead, focus on 
selling parts in replacement markets locally and abro d. Some part makers are both 
OEMs and REMs. Suppliers in Thailand have longer experiences in learning and 
accumulating technological capabilities than those in Vietnam. Apart from engine and 
gear which require highest technological capabilities, other components can be made 
locally. In Thailand there are two emerging pure-Thai OBMs companies producing 
motorcycles with their own brand, distributing channels, and networks of suppliers. 
Started in 2000, Tiger Motor became the fourth largest producer of motorcycles in 
Thailand with the market share of 3 per cent (see Table 1). This pure-Thai firm has an 
aim of not only having its own brand but trying to build and upgrade technological 
capabilities of a network of pure-Thai suppliers under the slogan “Tiger, Pure-Thai 
Motorcycle”. However, in practice, Tiger still has to seek technologically-sophisticated 
parts from Japanese joint ventures in Thailand.  Another is a group of Thai suppliers, 
SME 007 Plus. They began with supplying motorcycle parts to Japanese TNCS and 
selling their products in replacement markets both in Thailand and abroad. With five core 
companies, the network of almost 100 SMEs have been built. They have jointly 
developed a few motorcycle parts (e.g. chain and choke) and selling them under the co-
brand “SME 007 Plus” They expanded their distribution network to cover repair shops all 
over Thailand. Recently, they teamed up with a Thai electrical appliance, DiStar, which 
has financial strength and extensive distribution network, to produce a prototype of the 
whole motorcycle, initially expected to be sold in 2006. 
 
There are also companies which are capital goods (mostly engine) suppliers to 
motorcycles assemblers and part makers. Local capital goods industry in Thailand is 
relatively weak. Most types of engines are, therefore, imported from abroad. The linkages 
                                                
4 OEM and ODM are specific forms of subcontracting. Under Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM), a latecomer 
firm produces a finished product to the precise specification of a foreign transnational corporation (TNC), which will 
market under its brand name via its own distribution channels. Under Own-Design Manufacture (ODM), a latecomer 
firms also carries out some or all of the product design (Hobday, 1995: 37). 
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between producers in motorcycle industry and their capital good suppliers are only 
limited to market transaction and advice on how to ‘operate’ machine. There is virtually 
no knowledge exchanges leading to technological upgrading (GMI, 2006).  
 
 
Table 1. Market Share of Motorcycle Industry in Thailand in 2003 
 
Company Year of Establishment  Market Share  
Thai Honda Manufacturing 1965 72% 
Thai Suzuki Motor  1968 13% 
Thai Yamaha Motor 1966 10% 
Tiger Motor 2000 3% 
Kawasaki Motors (Thailand) 1976 2% 
Source: GMI, King Mongkut University of Technology Thonburi (2004) 
 
Motorcycle industry in Vietnam started to develop only in the early to mid-1990s, when 
the Vietnamese government launched import substitution policy of motorcycles by 
erecting trade barriers and providing incentives for foreign direct investment.  By the late 
1990s, the major motorcycle companies in Vietnam included: one Taiwanese TNC 
(VMEP, a subsidiary of Taiwan’s Sanyang Motors5) and three Japanese TNCs (Suzuki, 
Honda and Yamaha) (Table 2). Some Taiwanese and Japanese parts manufacturers 
followed the motorcycle companies to invest in Vietnam, producing such parts as tyres, 
batteries, electric parts, brakes, and plastic parts.  The number of Taiwanese suppliers that 
initially followed Sanyang amounted to 13 (Chen and Jou 2002).  The number of 
Japanese suppliers was smaller, reflecting the small market size and unstable investment 
environment in the mid-1990s. The number of local prts suppliers was even more 
limited.  Although there were numerous local companies producing replacement parts, 
they were outside the procurement networks of foreign motorcycle companies. The 
reasons are two-fold: the foreign motorcycle companies were not compelled to increase 
the local content ratio at this stage, and they regarded the technological level of local 
parts companies as too low. Apart from a few state-owned machinery companies that 
started to produce parts for Honda Vietnam in the lat 1990s, virtually no local parts 
suppliers participated in the procurement network of the TNCs.  As of the late 1990s, 
Japanese motorcycle companies depended largely on parts roduced in-house and parts 
imported from abroad, especially Thailand.  
 
 
Table 2. Major Foreign Motorcycle Companies in Vietnam 
Company Year of 
license 
Ownership structure 
Vietnam Manufacture & Export 
Processing Co., Ltd. (VMEP) 
1992 Taiwan (100%) 
GMN Automobile & Motorcycle Parts 
Manufacture JV Co., Ltd. (GMN) 
1995 JV (Thailand, Laos, Vietnam) 
                                                
5 Chinfon Group, the parent company of Sanyang Motors, holds 100% stake in VMEP. 
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Vietnam Suzuki Corp. 1995 JV (Japan, Vietnam) 
Honda Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1996 JV (Japan, Thailand, Vietnam) 
Yamaha Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1998 JV (Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam) 
Lifan Motorcycle Manufacturing JV 
Co. 
2002 JV (China, Vietnam) 
Note: JV stands for “joint venture.” 
Source: Survey by the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social 
Science in 2004, author’s interviews. 
 
Government 
Apart from firms, differences in roles played by non-firm agents contribute to differences 
of the evolution of the two countries’ sectoral system of innovation and production. The 
Thai government, for the first-time in the history of the country’s industrial policy, has 
selective policies under Thaksin administration, which started in 2001 (see 
Intarakumnerd, 2006). The government has an aspiration to make Thailand the Detroit of 
Asia i.e., to be a global center for producing car,motorcycle and automotive part. It sets a 
clear target for the country to produce 10 million cars by 2010. To realize this mission, 
the ten-year National Science and Technology Strategic Plan (2004-2013) aims to 
produce 1,000 researchers, and 4,000 specialized engineers in automotive industry 
(National Science and Technology Policy Committee, 2004).  
 
Implementation of these government plans by concerned agencies is still far from being 
coherent and synergistic (Institute of Intellectual Property, 2006:29). However, there is a 
specific organization responsible for development of the country’s automotive industry. 
The Thai Automotive Institute was set up as an independent public organization under 
the Ministry of Industry in 1988. It aims to operate like a private-sector organization with 
high level of flexibility and efficiency. The main objective is to be the centre for 
supporting development of the Thai automotive sector to be a main exporting base in the 
world. The institute has broad functions. It plays n important role in formulating policies 
for the industry, coordinating to implement those policies, setting and enforcing industrial 
standards, providing technical services such as testing, calibrating and quality assurance, 
and market information, applying results from research to up grade technological 
capabilities and quality control system to the global standard, and finally developing 
high-caliber human resources for the industry. The institute is trying to act as an 
intermediary bringing in external technology and knowledge to upgrade technological 
capabilities of local suppliers. One of the important programs of the institute was 
Automotive Experts Dispatching Program (2003-2005) to bring Japanese experts to 
transfer key production technologies and skills, including those for mold and die design, 
and plant management to engineers and technicians of 200 Thai OEMs and REMs which 
joined the program. The program was a collaborative program between Thai and 
Japanese governments. Japanese experts were dispatched from Japan, including those 
who used to work for Japanese TNCs before (Thai Automo ive Institute, 2006).  
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Vietnam regarded motorcycle industry as a “key industry.” However, it has never come 
up with comprehensive policy to develop the motorcycle industry6. Since the mid-1990s, 
individual policy instruments, such as import protection, incentives for foreign direct 
investment, and product quality and safety standards, were formulated in an ad hoc and 
often inconsistent manner.  Involvement of different ministries such as Ministries of 
Industry, Trade, and Science, Technology and Enviroment and the lack of coordination 
between them are partly responsible for these problems. Frequent changes and weak 
enforcement have been noted by foreign companies as serious problems. To illustrate, 
despite the fact that imports of CBUs was controlled by import quotas up to 1998 and 
was prohibited from 1998, new and secondhand CBUs made in Thailand and Japan 
continued to be smuggled into Vietnam in large numbers.  Recurrent complaints by the 
foreign companies about the Vietnamese government policies7 clearly demonstrate the 
general absence of trust between the government and foreign companies. Public-private 
collaboration in the motorcycle industry as seen in the case of Thailand did not emerge.  
 
Supporting Knowledge-producing Agents 
Given the size and significance of the automotive industry in Thailand, special education 
programs for the industry are very much needed. There are a few education programs for 
automotive industry. Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Engineering has the most 
recognized and specific one, as it offers B.E. in Automotive Engineering. A Thai-
language program started in 1995. It produced 15 high quality graduates annually. Toyota 
has been providing significant support in terms of equipment and instructors. After 
graduation, many students were recruited by Toyota. Since 2005, the Faculty has offered 
an English-language program aiming at producing 100 graduates per year. The instructors 
came from both Thai and foreign academics as well as guest lecturers from the 
automotive industry (Boonchukosol, 2006).  
 
Besides education, the linkages and knowledge flow between firms in motorcycle 
industry and education institutes in Thailand are rther weak and fragmented. Firms have 
linkages with individual faculty members than organiz tional linkages. The 
organizational linkages mostly limited to sending students to have internship with 
companies, testing and consultancy for solving basic production problems. In Thai 
universities, there are some research projects on automotive technologies but there is 
none specifically on ‘motorcycle technologies’, needl ss to say about the collaborative 
research between firms and universities (GMI, 2004).  
                                                
6 In 2002, the Prime Minister promulgated the strategy for development of machinery industry up to the 
year 2020 (Prime Minster’s Decision 186/2002/QD-TTg dated December 26, 2002). Preparation of a 
specific strategy for development of motorcycle industry has been proceeding for the past few years, but to 
date the strategy has not come out. 
7  There were numerous occasions when Vietnam’s policies towards the motorcycle industry received 
criticisms from companies, both foreign and local. The most prominent example was observed in 
September 2002, when the Vietnamese government suddenly announced the import quota for motorcycle 
companies for the whole year (“Motorcycle makers to send reps to Vietnam” The Japan Times, Oct. 10, 
2002; “Japanese Automobile Association to visit Hanoi” Vietnam Economic Times, Oct. 15, 2002). Due to 
the sudden imposition quota, a number of foreign motorcycle companies that used up the quota, including 
Honda Vietnam and Yamaha Vietnam, had to temporarily stop their operations because they could not 
import parts.   
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The linkages with research and technological supporting organizations are insufficient 
but better than those with education institutes. For example, the Thai German Institute, 
the largest and most advanced training centre for industrial technologies in Thailand, 
provides technical services and course-based or tail -made training to entrepreneurs in 
rather advanced technologies related design and producti n systems, especially in mold 
and die technology and computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing, 
automated production and precision machining (Thai German Institute, 2006). National 
Metal and Materials Centre (MTEC) under National Scien e and Technology 
Development Agency (NSTDA) has been conducting research quite relevant to the 
automotive industry such as finite elements, which can be used for designing many parts 
of motorcycle and automobile, computer-aided design, engineering and manufacturing, 
failure analysis and material degradation. It also provides testing and training services to 
the private sector in the aforementioned areas as well (National Metal and Materials 
Centre, 2006). As mentioned above, higher degree competition due to global sourcing 
strategies of TNCs and China’s threats, the Thai companies are trying to forge more and 
deeper collaboration with local universities and research institutes.  
 
In Vietnam, while formal education and training inst tutions targeting the demands of the 
industry remain insufficient, in-house training within foreign companies seems to have 
worked relatively well8. Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Universities of Technology, with 
programs on mechanical engineering, were cited as important sources of engineers for 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. The newly recruit d engineers generally go through 
substantial in-house training for more practical skills as specific methods of management 
and requirements of Japanese companies. Most Japanese companies interviewed by the 
author emphasized the high quality of the Vietnamese ngineers and workers, a key to 
improving the quality and production efficiency within the factory. 
 
For Japanese motorcycle and parts companies in Vietnam, knowledge flows mainly 
originate abroad, especially their headquarters (research institutes) in Japan. For instance, 
Honda has regional R&D center in Thailand, which cooperates with headquarters in 
Japan closely in product development and design for Honda’s subsidiaries in Southeast 
Asia. Honda’s factory in Vietnam receives substantial echnical support from the 
headquarters in Japan and R&D Center in Thailand, in launching new models, finding 
potential local suppliers and providing technical assistance to them, and so on.  
 
Vietnam does not have a research institute specifically targeting the automotive industry, 
but has a few public research institutes engaged in the wider filed of machinery industry. 
Among them, Research Institute of Technology for Machinery (RITM) under state-
owned Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation and Industrial 
Machinery and Instruments Holding (IMI) under the direct management of the Ministry 
of Industry are engaged in research and training in the fields closely related to the 
production of motorcycle parts, such as die casting, forging, metal stamping, testing, and 
production of molds and dies. In particular, IMI Holding has been successful in 
                                                
8  This paragraph is based on author’s interview with Honda Vietnam, Yamaha Vietnam, and several 
Japanese parts manufacturers in Vietnam. 
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upgrading the level of equipment and technology through assistance from international 
organizations and companies in developed countries9.  However, even IMI is fraught with 
weaknesses such as limited linkages between its R&D and training activities and the 
actual demands in the industry.  Virtually none of the companies surveyed by the author, 
including state-owned ones, had substantial linkage with the public research institutes. 
 
Institutions 
Institutions like laws, norms, routines, standards and so forth play important role in 
shaping behavior of agents and their interaction among each other. For example, one 
factor that somewhat explain the different of Thailand and Vietnam in terms of the 
increase in imports from China is the different ‘perception’ of consumers in both 
countries. In Thailand, motorcycles and their parts p oduced from China are perceived as 
products inferior to those produced locally. Japanese motorcycles have very established 
brand names.  In Vietnam, foreign motorcycle brands are generally new to the consumers, 
with the exception of “Honda.” This is because secondhand Honda motorcycles, 
imported initially from Japan and more recently from Thailand, have been in the country 
for decades10.   However, as of the late 1990s even Honda, not to mention other TNCs 
that entered Vietnam in the 1990s, had experienced difficulties in expanding its sales. 
The main reason was that the price (above US$2,000) was too high for ordinary people.   
Japanese motorcycle companies had failed to notice the normous “potential” demand for 
low-cost motorcycles for daily transportation. This missed opportunities have been 
grabbed by Chinese motorcycle companies. 
 
Moreover, industrial standards concerning quality, efficiency, consumer safety and 
environment were introduced and enforced more strictly n Thailand. These, in effect, 
block inferior Chinese imports.  Therefore, Chinese motorcycle/parts were not as 
successful as in Vietnam in penetrating into Thai mrket. On the other hand, in Vietnam, 
quality and environmental standards, safety regulations, and other policies were newly 
emerging and enforcement was seriously weak. 
 
 
5. Evolution of the Sectoral Innovation System under China’s Threats and 
Opportunities 
 
5.1 The extent of China’s impact on motorcycle industries in Thailand and Vietnam 
As noted in Section 2, the “export drive” of Chinese motorcycle companies accelerated 
since the late 1990s. However, its impact differed significantly between Thailand and 
Vietnam. Table 3 shows that China’s exports of motorcycles and parts gradually 
increased in the early 2000s but remained insignificant. The market structure also 
                                                
9 This remark was made by two Japanese engineering specialists who visited the company in 2001 under a 
project by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) aiming at strengthening supporting industry in 
Vietnam.   
10 The first “Honda” boom in Vietnam took place in the 1960s, in the midst of Vietnam War. 
Tens of thousands of Honda Supercubs were imported into the country and used mainly by 
American military officers stationed in South Vietnam. After the reunification of the country 
in 1975, secondhand Honda Supercubs continued to be traded within the country, due to its 
remarkable durability, high fuel efficiency, and ease of maintenance and repair.   
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remained relatively stable, major Japanese TNCs keeping the lion’s share (Table 1). In 
contrasts, China’s exports of motorcycles to Vietnam increased dramatically between 
1999 and 2002.  It reached over 1.8 million in 2001, more than triple the annual sales in 
the mid-1990s.  In 2000, so-called “Chinese motorcycles,” motorcycles assembled by 
Vietnamese companies using the knocked-down kits imported from China, accounted for 
nearly 80% of Vietnamese motorcycle market (see Figure 1), significantly reducing the 
share of Japanese motorcycle companies. The low-priced “Chinese motorcycles” 
significantly enlarged Vietnam’s motorcycle market, changing it from “assets” to means 
of daily transport for ordinary people. 
 







1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Others
Honda Vietnam Co., Ltd.
" Chinese"  motorcycles
 
Notes: 1) ‘“Chinese” motorcycles’ include motorcycles assembled by Vietnamese companies 
mainly using parts imported from China. 
2) ‘Others’ include: (a) motorcycles produced by foreign motorcycles assembling companies 
based in Vietnam other than Honda Vietnam (e.g., Vietnam Export Manufacturing Processing 
Co., Ltd. (VMEP; a subsidiary of Taiwan’s Sanyang Motors), Vietnam Suzuki, and Yamaha 
Vietnam) and (b) imported motorcycles including those made by Honda’s subsidiaries abroad 
(e.g., Thailand).  
Source: Authors’interview at Honda Vietnam in Septemb r 2004. 
 
The difference can be explained, first and foremost, by the difference in effectiveness of 
import controls by the respective governments. While Vietnam prohibited import of 
CBUs and imposed tariffs on parts according to the local content ratio, Chinese 
motorcycles were imported into the country by local tr ders, who claimed false local 
content ratio to evade tax. In Thailand, import contr ls were effectively enforced.   
Second, price differentials between the locally produced motorcycles and Chinese 
motorcycles were much larger in Vietnam than in Thailand.  In Vietnam, the Chinese 
motorcycles were priced one-third or even one-fourth (around US$500 to 800, compared 
to the US$2,000 or over for Japanese brand motorcycles) of the motorcycles produced 
locally by Japanese motorcycle companies.  Third, Japanese TNCs took much stronger 
hold of the market, in terms of brand diffusion and nation-wide distribution and service 
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networks, in Thailand than in Vietnam, reflecting the history of operation in the 
respective countries.  
 
Table 3
China's Export of Motorcycles and Parts to Thailand  Vietnam
(1) Motorcycles Unit: number of motorcycles
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Thailand 378 6 84 1 361 384 1,041 13,054 14,706 15,906 39,158
Vietnam 3,801 2,417 861 548 89,778 1,229,195 1,833,073 284,194 31,193 25,466 68,203
(2) Parts Unit: Million US$
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Thailand Engines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 6 8
Other parts 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 8 12 10 17
Total 1 2 2 2 2 4 5 11 20 16 25
Vietnam Engines 0 0 0 0 0 5 50 80 23 46 31
Other parts 0 0 0 1 2 19 35 52 36 46 32
Total 0 0 0 1 2 24 85 132 59 92 62
Notes: HS codes corresponding to each of the categories are as follows: motorcycles (8711), engines (840732) and parts other than engines (871419).
Source: World Trade Atlas.  
 
5.2 How Thailand and Vietnam’s sectoral innovation systems were transformed 
Whereas data on imports, sales and market share demonstrate the difference in terms of 
the extent to which motorcycle industries in the two countries were affected by China’s 
export drive, examination of the dynamics of the sectoral innovation system in the two 
countries provides much deeper insights into similarities and differences in the way 
different agents and institutions reacted to the new challenges.  Generally, the longer 
presence of Japanese TNCs and higher indigenous technological and marketing 
capabilities of Thai assemblers and part suppliers making Thailand less vulnerable to 
China’s threat.  
 
Different types of firms behave differently when facing a common external factor. To 
Japanese companies in Vietnam and Thailand, China is undoubtedly a competitor.  Here 
we can observe similarities in strategies within the same company across countries (i.e. 
Thailand and Vietnam) yet differences across companies, which reflect regional 
strategies of the TNCs. In the case of Honda, the company pursued a common strategy of 
launching low-priced models in both countries. In Vietnam, where the company’s market 
share diminished sharply, “Waveα” was launched in January 2002 with the price nearly 
one-third of the company’s previous models. In Thailand, where the company perceived 
“potential threat” from China, Wave 100 was launched June 200211.  “Wave α” was 
developed mainly in the Thai factory of Honda (Thai Honda Manufacturing Co., Ltd.), 
which was Honda Vietnam’s mother factory, in close collaboration with Honda R&D 
Southeast Asia in Thailand (Ohara, Tian and Lin, 2003).  The model was developed using 
the engine and body of Honda’s existing models, as well as low-priced Chinese parts to 
bring down production costs.  The new low-priced models quickly gained popularity in 
both countries.  Especially in Vietnam, Honda quickly recovered market share after 2002 
(Fiture 1). In contrast, Yamaha has pursued ‘higher value added’, with more emphasis on 
brand, design (for a new model), and quality in both countries, a strategy fundamentally 
different from Honda   
 
                                                
11 Interestingly, Honda did not launch low-priced models in Indonesia. 
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In terms of the local companies, we can observe clear differences between the two 
countries. For a more established Thai own-brand manufacturer like Tiger, China is 
viewed both as a competitor and an opportunity provider. To differentiate from Chinese 
motorcycles, Tiger is trying to produce higher-quality product for ‘upper’ market. It 
attempted to increase its own technological capabilities by doing setting up design and 
development department and starting collaboration with local universities and public 
research institutes. At the same time, some Chinese imported parts, not locally produced, 
were accepted. This gives Tiger flexibility in choosing the best parts for their 
motorcycles. For SME 007 Plus, impacts of China are quite substantial. It is a new group 
of part producers with rather low level of technological capabilities (relative to Tiger) and 
they cannot produce all parts by their members. Therefore, they decided to change their 
strategy from assembling the whole motorcycle with its own brand name to importing 
designed frame and major components which cannot be produced by its group’s members 
such as engine and crush from China. The plan to produce the branded motorcycle has 
been postponed. Instead, the group moved downstream the value chain to recruit repair 
shops as members and try to modernize these shops by introducing new shop layout and 
modern management. By doing that, the group aims to stimulate demand from 
downstream (repair shops) members for components produced the group’s upstream 
(manufacturing) members (Katikarn, 2006). The leaders of the group are very 
entrepreneurial and very capable in developing relationship with government agencies. 
The new movement to upgrade repair shops has got a financial support from National 
Innovation Agency and Department of Industrial Promotion (under the Ministry of 
Industry) and technical support from Faculty of Engineering, Kasetsart University. It also 
received financial support to develop a software program for managing its information 
system and supply chain, especially franchising,  management from Software Industry 
Promotion Agency and Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce 
(see Intellectual Property Institute, 2006).   
 
For part suppliers, there are differences between Japanese (pure-Japanese or joint 
ventures) suppliers and local (pure-Thai) suppliers. The local pure-Thai suppliers have 
lower technological capabilities than Japanese counterparts which have technological 
transfer from their mother companies in Japan. Also First-tier Japanese part makers in 
Thailand usually have long-term relationships with their customers (Japanese OBMs). In 
some cases, engineers from Japanese OBMs were sent to co-develop parts or components 
manufactured by part makers or giving advice on how t  upgrade production system but   
the cooperation has not reached the level of joint R&D which is mostly done in Japan. 
Undoubtedly, the threat from China is more intimidating for the pure-Thai suppliers 
especially the second-and third-tier ones.  
 
In Vietnam, the surge of imports from China provided new opportunities for local 
businesses. Since Vietnam prohibited imports of CBUs from 1998 to 2003, Chinese 
motorcycles had to be imported as knocked-down parts, nd had to be re-assembled in 
Vietnam12 . As the result over 50 local companies assembling imported Chinese 
                                                
12 Since assembled motorcycles could not be imported, Chinese motorcycles went through the Vietnamese 
customs as knocked-down parts. The parts were re-assembled by Vietnamese companies. But the Chinese 
customs statistics (Table 3) show that China’s exports in the years 1999-2001 were in the form of 
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motorcycle parts emerged. However, they faced difficulties from 2002 onwards, when the 
Vietnamese government significantly strengthened regulations on motorcycle industry by 
the following measures: (1) stronger enforcement of import tariffs according to the local 
content ratio, (2) “standards for motorcycle manufacturing companies,” requiring, among 
others, in-house production of key parts, and (3) renewed quality and environmental 
standards.  While many local companies left the industry, some local companies 
remained, investing in in-house production of parts. A few even started to develop own 
motorcycle brands and distribution networks.  
 
These local companies continue to keep certain market share due to their price advantage 
vis-à-vis Japanese products (see Figure 1). Yet, accumulation of technological 
capabilities within these local companies is limited. First, unlike in Thailand, they have 
not succeeded in developing their own motorcycle models instead of ‘copies’ of Japanese 
models. Second, many are largely dependent on foreign partners for in-house production 
of parts, or largely use imported parts or parts produced by Chinese companies based in 
Vietnam. Among the companies interviewed by the author, Company A, one of the 
largest local motorcycle companies, whose production reached 200,000 units in 2004, 
was heavily reliant on the Chinese partner.  The company’s basic strategy was: “the 
Vietnamese would look after the sales and management, while the Chinese engineers 
would take care of the production.” The company hada joint venture with a Chinese 
motorcycle company to produce motorcycle parts, where 50 Chinese engineers were 
stationed to assist Vietnamese workers in 2004, 2 years after the factory started 
operations. Company A also cooperated closely with Chinese parts companies located in 
the neighborhood.  The close cooperation with Chinese partners enabled Company A to 
rapidly increase production and bring down the production cost.  In contrast, Company B 
pursued more self-reliant strategy to avoid over-dependence on foreign partners. It has 
become clear, however, that upgrading its own technological level through trial-and-error 
is too time-consuming when it has to compete in a highly competitive market consisting 
of the powerful Japanese TNCs and numerous local companies.  Against this background, 
Company B had to increase the use of imported partsfrom China in the recent years. The 
increased use of Chinese parts was widely observed among many local motorcycle 
companies. Table 2 also confirms that imports of engines and parts from China increased 
rapidly since 2003.  
 
More positive developments, however, can be observed in motorcycle part production. 
As pointed out in Section 3.2, companies producing motorcycle parts in Vietnam were 
extremely limited prior to China’s export drive. However, the emergence of numerous 
local motorcycle companies created substantial demand for low-priced motorcycle parts, 
giving impetus to numerous local companies, previously producing motorcycle 
replacement parts, bicycle parts, or machinery parts, to enter into motorcycle parts 
production.  While many of the new entrants are suffering from the falling demand due to 
the demise of the local motorcycle companies, some f these new entrants have managed 
to participate in the procurement networks of Japanese and Taiwanese TNCs mainly as 
                                                                                                                                      
assembled motorcycles, suggesting that the motorcycles were knocked down mainly for the purpose of 
getting through Vietnam’s customs. 
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second-tier suppliers13.  Two of the three second-tier suppliers interviewed by the author 
received regular assistance in production technology and quality controls either from the 
first-tier supplier or directly from the Japanese motorcycle company. 
 
The analysis above suggests that the external threat from China, by inducing changes in 
firms’ strategies and market environment, entry of new firms, creation of new inter-firm 
relationships, and changes in government policies, significantly transformed Vietnam’s 




The above findings shed some lights on the evolution of sectoral system of innovation 
and production.  Theoretical implication to the conept of sectoral system of innovation 
and production can be highlighted.  
 
The same external factor can be both threats and opportunities that can influence the 
transformation of a sectoral system of innovation and production as shown in the cases of 
motorcycle sectoral systems of innovation and production in Thailand and Vietnam. 
Under such transformation ‘new’ types of agent, new inter-firm relationship, new types 
of collaboration between firms and non-firm agents can emerged while ‘existing’ ones 
can be strengthen, weaken or disappeared. 
 
Different sectoral systems of innovation and production can evolve differently when they 
are facing similar threats and opportunities. The dir ction and the pace of evolution 
depends very much on existing capabilities of agents, strength of their linkages and their 
processes of collective learning to withstand the treats and exploit opportunities. To 
illustrate, Thailand can withstand the threats and exploit opportunities better than 
Vietnam (i.e., being more equal partners with Chinese part makers) because, despite still 
being rather weak and fragmented, its motorcycle sectoral system of innovation and 
production has ‘relatively’ more capable agents (i.e., longer-present and more 
technologically sophisticated TNCs, local champions who are own-brand manufacturers, 
government with more vivid and targeted government strategies for automotive sector, 
more sectoral-specific and active government supporting agencies, universities and 
research institutes) and ‘relatively’ more interaction especially knowledge transfer among 
agents.  
 
An external factor, in this case being threats and opportunities from China, induces 
changes in strategies of agents, higher degree of interactions among agents and more 
variation in the sectoral system of innovation and production. For example, a Thai OBM 
producer, Tiger, and some locally-own suppliers were forced to make greater in-house 
effort in deepen their own technological capabilities and develop more outward-looking 
strategies such as forging collaboration with local universities and research institutes to 
                                                
13 Six foreign parts suppliers based in Vietnam interviewed by the author (Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean 
first-tier suplliers) used an average of 27 second-tier suppliers, 22 of which were local companies. Majority 
of the second-tier local suppliers had newly entered into the production of motorcycle to supply parts to 
local motorcycle companies, and were located near the first-tier suppliers.   
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improve existing products and production processes in order to outperform Chinese 
competitors. Local entrepreneurs in Vietnam seized th  opportunity by collaborating with 
Chinese firms to start new businesses as motorcycle part suppliers.   
Given external threats and opportunities, firms in both countries do play more important 
roles than non-firm agents in transforming sectoral system of innovation and production.  
In the case of Vietnam, however, relatively weaker dynamic linkages between firms and 
non-firm agents such as universities and research institutes, allow firms to play even 
more decisive role in the transformation of the sectoral system. 
 
While the direction and the capacities of the local companies to respond to the external 
threat were largely shaped by the capabilities of existing agents and institutions in the 
country, explaining the strategies of TNCs calls for a regional perspective. Honda, for 
instance, perceived what happened in Vietnam in 2000 to 2001 as a fundamental threat to 
the company’s operations in Asia as a whole, which had to be countered by close 
collaboration between its subsidiaries in the region. The new low-priced model was 
developed mainly in the company’s production and R&D bases in Thailand, and the new 
model was launched not only in Vietnam but also in Thailand, where China’s impact was 
still only a threat. In contrast, Yamaha has tried to increase value added of their products 
through brand, design, and quality, a strategy commn to both Thailand and Vietnam. 
The different strategies of the two Japanese TNCs also illustrate that even within the 
same sectoral system of innovation and production, different firms adopt different 
strategies and change differently when facing similar external factors.  
 
Within the same sectoral system of innovation and production, while there might be an 
opportunity and a threat created from an external factor for many firms, the ‘realization’ 
of that opportunity and preventing that threat depends very much on firms’ abilities to 
seize such opportunities and fending off threat. For instance, while, the SME 007 Plus 
needed to postpone its plan to build the whole motorcycle under its own brand name, 
Tiger managed to survive and turn threat into opportunities to be able source some 
motorcycle parts from China. This can be achieved bcause its level of technological 
capabilities is higher than that of SME 007 (and relatively high comparing with Chinese 
competitor). For part suppliers, the ability to integrate into global production networks of 
TNCs is also an important factor in fending off the threat. In Vietnam, more 
accumulation and learning happen in local parts companies that are incorporated in to the 
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